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1. Introduction
In this paper, we present a mechanism generating intergenerational mobility and social
stratication based on the interaction between wealth, education, and labor e¤ort. Our
analysis is motivated by two empirical facts. First, there exist empirical support for the
so called "Carnegie conjecture", according to which those individuals who receive a large
inheritance are tempted to put small e¤ort in productive activities so that they may
end up enjoying a small amount of wealth.1 Several empirical papers have documented
a negative relationship between labor supply and the amount of inheritance individuals
receive. This reduction in the labor supply takes the form of a reduction in the number
of hours worked, an early retirement decision, or direct job quitting (see Brown et
al., 2010; Cox, 2014; Elinder et al., 2012; Erlend et al., 2012; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993;
Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994, 2006). The size of the negative e¤ect of inheritance in the
overall labor income found in these papers is very heterogeneous and depends crucially
on both the period of the life cycle where the intergenerational transmission of wealth
takes place and the expected or unexpected nature of inheritances. We should mention
however that there is another channel through which the amount of inheritance could
be positively correlated with earnings since it may favor entrepreneurship as it tends to
make less binding the liquidity constraints associated with starting a new business and,
moreover, the probability of success of that business increases with the amount of initial
capital (see Cox, 2014; and Holtz-Eakin, 1994). We will abstract from entrepreneurship
decisions in our analysis and restrict our focus on the e¤ort decision in a regular labor
market.
The second empirical fact motivating our analysis is the observed high
intergenerational persistence of education especially within highly educated families
(see Checchi et al., 1999, and Hertz et al., 2008). In particular, Hertz et al. estimated
the correlation between years of schooling between fathers and their children for a
large sample of 42 countries. One of the most striking results of their analysis is that
the strongest correlations (with values of the correlation coe¢ cient above 0.6) appear
in South America (Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Nicaragua)
and other countries like Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan where the credit constraints
to nance education seem to be quite pervasive. The high persistence in education
attainment in South America is also found in Behrman et al. (2001). However,
Nordic countries display lower estimates of intergenerational education correlations
(Chevalier et al, 2009 and Hertz et al., 2008), which is consistent with the idea that
intergenerational educational persistence is lower in countries with a strong welfare state
devoting a large fraction of public spending to education so that borrowing constraints
have weaker e¤ects on human capital investment.
Relying upon the previous empirical evidence, we aim to build a model that
gives raise to oscillations in wealth within a dynasty while keeping intergenerational
persistence in education. The mechanism that we propose is based on the interaction
between e¤ort and wealth suggested by the Carnegie conjecture. In particular, the
oscillations in wealth arise from changes in the e¤ort exerted by di¤erent generations
1Andrew Carnegie, the famous 19th century steel businessman, stated: the parent who leaves his
son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to live a
less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would ...(Carnegie, 1962).
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as a response to both inherited wealth and education return (or college premium).
Our mechanism generates a rich social stratication with four classes in the long-run:
(1) A poor class composed of unskilled individuals who do not make e¤ort; (2) a rich
class composed of skilled individuals who make e¤ort; (3) a middle class composed of
unskilled individuals who make e¤ort; and (4) another middle class composed of skilled
individuals who do not exert e¤ort. Moreover, we generate large mobility among classes
even in the long run. In particular, we obtain both upward and downward mobility
and long-run cycles between the two classes of unskilled individuals and between the
two classes of skilled individuals. These oscillations are in fact a direct consequence
of the Carnegie conjecture: when an individual receives a large inheritance he exerts
small e¤ort so that the wealth of the family decreases. Since the next generation
receives a small inheritance, their members make more e¤ort and the wealth of the
family increases again. This strong and deterministic mobility in wealth agrees with
the studies reported by Cochell and Zeeb (2005), according to which six out of ten
a­ uent families will lose the family fortune by the end of the second generation and
nine out of ten will loose it by the end of the third generation. Our model will achieve
however a deterministic reversal of fortune in just one generation. This extreme form
of mobility will allow us to highlight the key assumptions underlying the mechanism at
work.
Our theory combines several ingredients. First, we assume that investment in
human capital is indivisible so that a minimum level of expenditure on education is
required to acquire human capital. Second, we assume that individuals face a borrowing
constraint so that only those with a su¢ ciently high level of initial wealth can a¤ord the
cost of education. These two assumptions impose a barrier on human capital investment
for poor individuals.
Third, we assume that labor supply is endogenous and indivisible in the sense that
individuals have to choose an occupation. We assume that an occupation is the set of
productive activities that require a similar labor e¤ort and, moreover, individuals will
derive disutility from the amount of e¤ort they exert. Furthermore, to generate a trade
o¤ in the occupation choice, we assume that labor earnings are an increasing function
of both the human capital level and the amount of e¤ort exerted by the worker. We can
thus illustrate the di¤erence in the behavior of intergenerational mobility of earnings
and of education by taking into account the observed large intergenerational mobility
in occupations inside each skill class. Under the assumption that the level of e¤ort
(and thus of earnings) associated with di¤erent occupations requiring the same level
of skill is very heterogeneous, we could attribute the observed large intergenerational
mobility in lifetime income to the sizeable di¤erences among the average earnings of
di¤erent occupations. In this respect, Zylbergerg (2013) documents the persistence in
the level of skill between parents and sons together with a large variability in earnings
within each level of skill. He reports average annual earnings of occupations with high
education requirements of around $63,000 with a standard deviation of $25,000 and, as
he says, "fathers in some well-paid occupations (surgeons) are very likely to have sons in
average-salary occupations (teachers), without reneging on the long-term perspectives
of the dynasty."
Finally, our results rely crucially on the following natural assumption: human
capital and labor e¤ort are strong complements when determining labor earnings.
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In other words, the return from e¤ort is higher for the more educated individuals
than for the unskilled individuals. This assumption is quite standard in the literature
dealing with labor and education (see Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; and Karasiotou, 2012).
Moreover, there is empirical evidence suggesting the realism of this assumption. For
instance, data from the OCDE Labor Force Statistics show that better-educated
workers exhibit larger participation rates, retire later, and work more hours.
The main contribution of our model is to show that the existence of a rich social
structure with several classes relies both on the di¤erences among wages imposed by
technology and on the policies implemented by the government. Thus, non-marginal
changes in either wages or scal policy may alter the social structure and thus cause
dramatic changes in wealth inequality. On the one hand, the changes in the wage
distribution occurred in recent years, where we have witnessed an increase in the wage
dispersion among di¤erent occupations, a rise in the skill premium, and a relative
decrease of wages in occupations requiring an intermediate level of skill, have a¤ected
indeed the structure of social classes in the economy (see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011;
Autor and Dorn, 2013; and Autor et al., 2016). On the other hand, the e¤ect of
changes in policy is analyzed in Section 7, where we show that under a strong welfare
state that sets a very low cost of education, the class of educated individuals exerting
e¤ort disappears as the lifetime income net of education cost for the educated will be
so high that e¤ort will be discouraged according to the Carnegie conjecture.
Our paper is mainly related with that of Degan and Thibault (2012) where the
Carnegie conjecture is explicitly modelled as the amount of e¤ort (and thus of labor
income) depends on the endogenous amount of inheritance individuals receive. The
di¤erent constellations of parameter values concerning bequest motive and e¤ort cost
considered by these authors give raise to a plethora of patterns of dynamic accumulation
of wealth. Our model di¤ers from that of Degan and Thibault because we introduce
accumulation of human capital. The acquisition of human capital through education
faces a borrowing constraint so that only the individuals who have received a su¢ ciently
large amount of inheritance can a¤ord the indivisible cost of education. Therefore, the
bequests left by a parent will play a triple role as they condition the initial wealth of
their children, the amount of e¤ort they will exert, and the skill level they will acquire
through formal education. Both e¤ort and skill will determine in turn the level of
lifetime income of the next generation within the dynasty.
Our analysis is also related with the literature on the role of borrowing constraints in
order to prevent individuals from acquiring education when there is an indivisible cost
associated with schooling. As was pointed out by Galor and Zeira (1993), the access
to education by the poorest individuals depends on whether they can borrow or not.
When there are capital market imperfections resulting in borrowing constraints, those
individuals with a level of wealth lying below some threshold value cannot a¤ord the
cost of education.2 Intergenerational transfers from parents to children could help
to ameliorate the negative e¤ects of borrowing constraints on the accumulation of
human capital. However, in an environment with credit market imperfections, only
those individuals who receive a su¢ ciently large inheritance can invest in human capital
(see Becker and Tomes, 1976; Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994; or Behrman et al., 1995).
2Dynarski (2002) and Keane (2002) analyze empirically the e¤ect of borrowing constraints on
decisions concerning human capital acquisition.
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Regarding the dynamics of wealth distribution, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that, if
one assumes credit market imperfections and an indivisible cost of education, then the
distribution of inherited wealth entirely determines the accumulation of human capital
and the dynamics of the subsequent distribution of wealth. Note that in our model each
individual will decide how much to invest in her own human capital. Other papers in
this strand of literature attribute instead this decision to the parents (Galor and Moav,
2004 and 2006; Alonso-Carrera, et al., 2012).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of
intergenerational transmission of wealth and of individual decisions concerning
education and e¤ort. Section 3 characterizes the dynamics of bequests. Section 4
and 5 characterize the dynamics of bequest, e¤ort, and human capital in the short
and in the long run, respectively, for the relevant case where education investment is
potentially protable for all individuals. Section 6 analyzes the inequality of wealth
in the long run. Section 7 discusses the relationship between the characteristics of the
welfare state and social stratication. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. The model
Let us consider an overlapping-generations economy (OLG) where individuals live for
two periods and have o¤spring at the end of the rst period of life. The exogenous
number of children per parent is n > 0; i.e., the gross rate of population growth is n: In
the rst period of his life an individual born in period t  1 receives an inheritance bt 1
from his parent. This inheritance can be devoted to save the amount st 1 or to pay
for education through formal schooling. In the second period of their lives, individuals
work, receive a salary wt; get a gross return Rt per unit of saving, consume the amount
ct, and leave the amount bt of bequest to each of their o¤spring. We index a generation
by the period at which their members work. Thus, the budget constraints in the two
periods of life for an individual belonging to generation t are
bt 1 = xt 1 + st 1 (2.1)
and
wt +Rtst 1 = ct + nbt; (2.2)
where xt 1 is the amount invested in education.
We assume that education has a xed indivisible cost  and impose the typical
borrowing constraint on education acquisition so that individuals can only pay for their
own education if the amount of inheritance is larger than the xed cost  of education.
This borrowing constraint implies that xt 1  bt 1 or, equivalently, st 1  0.3
Agents derive utility from the amount consumed in the second period of their lives
and from the bequest they leave to each of their descendents. Therefore individuals
display a "joy of giving" motivation for bequests (or "warm-glow" altruism) as in Abel
(1985) and Yaari (1965). Moreover, we assume that individuals may exert e¤ort when
3The model could be reformulated along the lines of Alonso-Carrera et. al. (2012), Galor and Moav
(2004 and 2006), or Zilcha (2003) in order to allow parents to pay directly for the education of their
children.
6
they work and this e¤ort results in a loss of utility. We assume the following logarithmic
functional form:
Ut = ln ct +  ln bt   et; (2.3)
where et is the level of e¤ort, which is assumed to be a discrete variable taking the
values 1 for the workers who exert e¤ort or 0 for the workers who do not exert e¤ort,
et 2 f0; 1g. As we have also mentioned in the Introduction, we can associate the level
of e¤ort with a given occupation so that there are occupations in the economy that
require the same level of skill but di¤erent amount of e¤ort. We are thus assuming for
simplicity that there are only two occupations for each level of skill. Given this assumed
discrete nature of e¤ort, the assumption of linear disutility from e¤ort is made without
loss of generality.
Individuals live in a small open economy with a constant returns to scale technology.
Hence, the gross rate Rt of return on capital is exogenously given as it has to be equal
to the international rate of return and, thus, since the capital-e¢ ciency units of labor
ratio is fully determined by Rt; the wage rate wt per e¢ ciency unit of labor is also
given. We assume that both rates are constant along time, Rt = R > 0 and wt = w for
all t. The number of e¢ ciency units supplied by a worker born in period t  1 depends
on both his level of human capital ht and the amount of e¤ort et he exerts according
to the strictly positive function "(ht; et):
We consider a simple form of technological indivisibility in the production of human
capital. In particular, the individual level of capital can take two values depending on
whether the investment in education is below or above the xed indivisible cost 
of education. Thus, the level of human capital at period t is given by the following
function:
ht =
8<:
1 if xt 1  ;
0 if xt 1 < :
(2.4)
A level of human capital equal to 1 corresponds to educated (or skilled) workers, whereas
a level equal to zero corresponds to uneducated (or unskilled) workers. Obviously,
the optimal investment in education for individuals who cannot a¤ord the minimum
cost  is xt 1 = 0; whereas those individuals who end up being educated will choose
xt 1 = : Observe that those individuals who receive an inheritance bt 1 strictly smaller
than  cannot invest in education even if they wish to do so. Therefore, the salary
compensation wt of a worker with the level ht of human capital exerting the amount et
of e¤ort will be equal to "(ht; et)w: Since the wage w per e¢ ciency unit is constant, to
ease the notation we dene the earning function w (ht; et)  "(ht; et)w so that
wt = w (ht; et) : (2.5)
We assume that the earning function w (ht; et) satises the following assumption:
Assumption A
(a) w (ht; 1) > w (ht; 0) for all values of ht;
(b) w (1; et) > w (0; et) for all values of et; and
(c) w (1; 1)  w (1; 0) > w (0; 1)  w (0; 0)
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The previous assumption is very plausible. Parts (a) and (b) say that wages are
increasing in human capital and e¤ort, while part (c) means that both arguments of
the function w (; ), human capital and e¤ort, are complementary, i.e., the function
w is supermodular since to exert e¤ort is more protable for skilled individuals than
for unskilled ones. Note that Assumption A does not allow us to make a comparison
between the labor income w (1; 0) of educated individuals who do not make e¤ort and
the labor income w(0; 1) of non-educated individuals who make e¤ort. Note that part
(c) can be rewritten as
w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) > w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) ; (2.6)
which means that education is more protable for the individuals that are willing to
exert positive e¤ort. The complementarity between e¤ort and education implies that
a rich individual who can a¤ord the cost of education but is not willing to exert e¤ort
may end up not investing in education when the wage premium of education under
no e¤ort is small. Similarly, a poor individual who cannot pay for his education may
choose a low level of e¤ort when the wage premium associated with e¤ort is too low
for non-educated individuals.
The problem faced by a generic individual of generation t is to nd the values of ct,
bt, et, and ht in order to maximize (2.3) subject to
wt +Rbt 1  Rxt 1 = ct + nbt; (2.7)
(2.4), et 2 f0; 1g ; and xt 1  bt 1: Note that the constraint (2.7) follows from
combining (2.1) and (2.2) and eliminating the saving st 1.
We solve this problem in two steps. First, given the values of education investment
xt 1 and e¤ort et, we obtain the following optimal values for consumption and bequest:
ct =
wt +Rbt 1  Rxt 1
1 + 
(2.8)
and
bt =
 (wt +Rbt 1  Rxt 1)
n (1 + )
: (2.9)
Next, we evaluate the utility function (2.3) at the optimal level of consumption
(2.8) and bequests (2.9) and use (2.5) to obtain the indirect utility
U (ht; et) = (1 + ) ln [w (ht; et) R X (ht) +Rbt 1]  et +M; (2.10)
whereM is a constant and X (ht) is the function mapping human capital into education
investment, which is implicitly dened by (2.4),
xt 1 = X (ht) =
8<:
 if ht = 1;
0 if ht = 0:
Then, we solve for the optimal values of e¤ort and human capital (or, equivalently,
of investment in education). Note that the optimal decisions will depend on the
inheritance received by individuals. The optimal decisions on education investment
and e¤ort are obtained from the direct comparison between di¤erent utility levels. To
simplify this comparison we dene   exp [=(1 + )] > 1 so that, using (2.10), we
obtain the following implications:
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1. The utility of an unskilled agent who makes positive e¤ort is larger than the
utility of an agent who acquires education but does not make positive e¤ort if
Ut (0; 1) > Ut (1; 0) ; that is, if
eb1  w (0; 1)   [w (1; 0) R]
(   1)R > bt 1:
2. Non-educated agents decide to make e¤ort if U (0; 1) > U (0; 0) ; that is, if
eb2  w (0; 1)  w (0; 0)
(   1)R > bt 1: (2.11)
3. Agents not exerting e¤ort decide to invest in education if U (1; 0) > U (0; 0) ; that
is, if
w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) > R:
4. Agents exerting e¤ort decide to invest in education if U (1; 1) > U (0; 1) ; that is,
if
w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) > R:
5. Educated agents decide to make positive e¤ort if U (1; 1) > U (1; 0) ; that is, if
eb3  w (1; 1)  w (1; 0)
(   1)R +  > bt 1: (2.12)
6. The utility of an agent who acquires education and make positive e¤ort is larger
than the utility of an agent who does neither educate nor make positive e¤ort if
Ut (1; 1) > Ut (0; 0) ; that is, if
eb4  w (1; 1)  w (0; 0) R
(   1)R > bt 1:
Implications 1, 2, 5 and 6 highlight the role of the amount of bequests in order
to induce workers to exert e¤ort. When the amount of inheritance individuals receive
is too large, the marginal utility of their consumption and bequest turns out to be
small and, thus, they optimally decide not to make e¤ort as the cost of e¤ort is larger
than the potential increase in utility arising from the amounts of own consumption and
left bequest. We have thus made explicit the mechanism lying behind the Carnegie
conjecture discussed in the Introduction.
To close the characterization of each individuals optimal plan, we should compare
the threshold levels of bequests eb1; eb2; eb3 and eb4: First, we obtain that eb4 > eb2 andeb3 > eb1 if and only if
w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) > R:
Note that the previous condition means that education is protable for at least those
agents who exert e¤ort. Second, we obtain that eb4 > eb3 and eb2 > eb1 if and only if
w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) > R: (2.13)
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This condition holds when education is protable for those agents who do not exert
e¤ort, which implies that it is also protable for the agents who exert e¤ort as follows
from part (c) of Assumption A. Finally, we obtain that eb3 > eb2 if and only if
 < e1  w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) R
w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) R: (2.14)
The numerator of (2.14) is the skill premium net of education cost for those individuals
who exert positive e¤ort, whereas the denominator is the net skill premium for those
who do not make e¤ort. Therefore, we have that eb3 > eb2 when the net labor income
gain from education for individuals exerting e¤ort is su¢ ciently large relative to the
net labor income gain for the individuals who do not make e¤ort.
3. The dynamics of bequests
The characterization of the equilibrium dynamics in this economy depends crucially on
part (c) of Assumption A, according to which the e¤ort premium is higher for the skilled
individuals than for the unskilled ones or, equivalently, the education premium of those
agents who make positive e¤ort is larger than the education premium of the individuals
who do not make positive e¤ort (see (2.6)): This assumption is compatible with the
following congurations of the parameter values characterizing the wage premia and
education cost:
Conguration 1. R > w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) :
Here the capitalized cost of education is larger than the increase in wage due to
education for the individuals exerting e¤ort. Therefore, according to (2.6) education is
never protable and no agent decides to be educated. Since agents never get educated
in this scenario, the threshold eb2 is the unique relevant threshold. Therefore, agents
make positive e¤ort if bt 1 < eb2 and make no e¤ort if bt 1 > eb2:
Conguration 2. w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) > R > w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) :
Here education is protable only for those agents who exert e¤ort. It is immediate
to see that the thresholds eb1 and eb3 are not relevant for the dynamics of bequest
and, moreover, eb2 < eb4 in this case. On the one hand, if eb2 < bt 1 < eb4;
then U (1; 1) > U (0; 0) > U (1; 0) and U (1; 1) > U (0; 1) for any value of eb1 andeb3: The previous rst inequality follows from the fact that bt 1 < eb4: The second
inequality comes from the fact that education is not protable for those individuals
who do not make e¤ort. The third inequality follows from the fact that education
is protable for agents who make positive e¤ort. On the other hand, if bt 1 > eb4
then U (0; 0) > U (1; 1) > U (0; 1) and U (0; 0) > U (1; 0) for any value of eb1 and eb3:
The rst inequality follows from the fact that bt 1 > eb4: The second inequality arises
from the fact that education is protable for those individuals who make e¤ort. The
third inequality comes from the fact that education is not protable for agents who
do not make positive e¤ort. Therefore, the only relevant inequality for the dynamics
of bequest in this scenario is eb2 < eb4: Finally, under this conguration, we should
distinguish between the following two cases:
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(a) If bt 1 <  then agents cannot a¤ord the cost of education. In this case, agents
make positive e¤ort if bt 1 < eb2 and make no e¤ort if bt 1 > eb2:
(b) If bt 1 >  then agents can a¤ord the cost of education. However, they will exert
positive e¤ort and, thus, they will become educated, if and only if bt 1 < eb4:
Otherwise, they will never acquire education nor exert e¤ort.
Conguration 3. w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) > R:
Here all agents want to invest in education since it is always protable to become
skilled regardless of the e¤ort level exerted by workers. Under this conguration, the
thresholds eb1 and eb4 are not relevant for the dynamics of bequests because they are
respectively smaller and larger than eb3. If bt 1 < eb3; then U (1; 1) > U (1; 0) > U (0; 0)
and U (1; 1) > U (0; 1) for any value of eb1 and eb4: The rst inequality follows from the
fact that bt 1 < eb3; whereas the second and third inequalities come from the fact that
education is always protable. On the contrary, if bt 1 > eb3; then U (1; 0) > U (1; 1) >
U (0; 1) and U (1; 0) > U (0; 0) for any value of eb1 and eb4: The rst inequality follows
from the fact that bt 1 > eb3; whereas the second and third inequalities arise from the
fact that education is always protable. Therefore, the values of ; eb2 and eb3 fully
determine the dynamics of bequests. In this scenario, we should distinguish between
the same two cases appearing in the previous parameter Conguration 2:
(a) If bt 1 <  then agents cannot a¤ord the cost of education. In this case, agents
make positive e¤ort if bt 1 < eb2 and make no e¤ort if bt 1 > eb2:
(b) If bt 1 >  then agents can a¤ord the cost of education. However, they will exert
positive e¤ort depending on the values of eb3:
We will conduct a detailed study of this Conguration 3 in the next section.
For all parameter congurations, we can use (2.9) to write the equilibrium dynamics
of bequest as the following di¤erence equation:
bt  B (bt 1; ht; et) = R
n (1 + )

bt 1 +
w (ht; et)
R
  X (ht)

: (3.1)
As it is customary in these models, we need a high rate n of population growth, a low
rate R of return on saving and a small intergenerational discount factor  in order to
prevent wealth from growing unboundedly across generations within the same dynasty.
The following assumption imposes accordingly the boundedness of the sequence of
bequests within a dynasty:
Assumption B
  R
n (1 + )
< 1: (3.2)
We can represent the dynamics of bequest in the (bt 1; bt) space by xing the values
ht of human capital and et of e¤ort. In this way, we obtain that the dynamics of bequest
is characterized by the piecewise linear function B (bt 1; ht; et) and the thresholds of
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inherited bequest ; eb2; eb3 and eb4; which determine in turn the endogenous values
of human capital ht and e¤ort et: We will use the following notation: B1 (bt 1) 
B (bt 1; 0; 0) ; B2 (bt 1)  B (bt 1; 0; 1) ; B3 (bt 1)  B (bt 1; 1; 0) and B4 (bt 1) 
B (bt 1; 1; 1) : From Assumption A we directly obtain that B3 (bt 1) < B4 (bt 1) and
B1 (bt 1) < B2 (bt 1) : Moreover, we can obtain the following additional orderings:
(i) B3 (bt 1) > B1 (bt 1) when w (1; 0)   w (0; 0) > R; that is, when education
is protable for all agents regardless of the e¤ort they exert. This is the
aforementioned Conguration 3 described above.
(ii) B4 (bt 1) > B2 (bt 1) when w (1; 1)   w (0; 1) > R; that is, when education is
protable for those agents who make positive e¤ort. This situation can appear
when the economy is under the Congurations 2 or 3 described above.
The xed points of the bequest function (3.1) are the potential steady states for the
amount of bequest. These four potential steady states values are given by
b1 = B
1 (b1) =


1  

w (0; 0)
R

; (3.3)
b2 = B
2 (b2) =


1  

w (0; 1)
R

; (3.4)
b3 = B
3 (b3) =


1  

w (1; 0)
R
  

; (3.5)
and
b4 = B
4 (b4) =


1  

w (1; 1)
R
  

: (3.6)
In the next section we will characterize the transitional dynamics driven by the bequest
functionsBi () ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4:We will analyze the evolution of bequest, e¤ort and human
capital when the investment in education is always protable, which corresponds to the
parametric Conguration 3. In the Appendix A we conduct the analysis for the other
two congurations.
4. Transitional dynamics when education is always protable
In this section, we characterize the one-period transition of the endogenous variables,
inheritance, e¤ort, and human capital, across generations when (2.13) holds. Note
that, given an initial value of inheritance, individuals choose the optimal values of
human capital, e¤ort and bequest left to the descendants and, moreover, the levels of
human capital and e¤ort fully determine total individual lifetime income. To conduct
a comprehensive analysis, we should consider the three parameter congurations
discussed in the previous section. However, since we are interested in an economy where
four classes of individuals emerge, namely, educated rich, educated poor, uneducated
rich, and educated poor individuals, we will restrict our analysis to Conguration 3
in the previous section, which corresponds to a situation where the investment in
acquiring human capital is always protable regardless of the amount of e¤ort. On
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the one hand, under Conguration 1 the cost of education is so high that nobody
will acquire education so that no educated individuals will appear in the long-run
equilibrium. On the other hand, under the parameter Conguration 2, the class formed
by the educated individuals with the smallest earnings (i.e., educated individuals who
do not make positive e¤ort) will not appear in equilibrium since education is only
protable for the individuals exerting e¤ort. Therefore, we are going to assume from
now on that w (1; 0)   w (0; 0) > R; which from the supermodularity of the earning
function (see part (c) in Assumption A) implies that w (1; 1)   w (0; 1) > R so that
the education premium is always larger than the capitalized value of education cost
regardless of the e¤ort level. In this case, all the branches of the bequest function (3.1)
may be operative. Moreover, as it was established in the previous section, we know
that B1 (bt 1) < B2 (bt 1) < B4 (bt 1) and B1 (bt 1) < B3 (bt 1) < B4 (bt 1) for all
bt 1.
Given bt 1 individual decisions on bequests, education, and e¤ort will depend on
the education cost  and the values of the thresholds eb2 and eb3: Hence, we should
distinguish among several cases depending on the ranking among the values of ; eb2
and eb3: We know from the previous section that eb2 < eb3 if and only if  < e1 (see
(2.14)): We next proceed with the analysis of all these cases:
Case 1.  > max
neb2;eb3o :
Here the evolution of bequests, education and e¤ort is given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < eb2;
B1 (bt 1) ; 0; 0
	
if bt 1 2
heb2;  ;
B3 (bt 1) ; 1; 0
	
if bt 1  :
Observe that the value of the threshold eb3 is irrelevant in this case. The dynamics of
the variables bt 1; ht; and et is fully governed by the relationship between ; eb2 and the
potential steady states b1; b2 and b3. Since in this case the number of potential steady-
states can be at most three, only three types of individuals (or social classes) may
appear in the long run: (i) unskilled agents who exert e¤ort, (ii) unskilled who make no
e¤ort, and (iii) skilled who do not exert e¤ort. Moreover, several stationary dynamics,
which involve di¤erent social classes in the long run, are possible: we can have locally
stable social classes and cycles involving switches between two social classes.
Case 2. eb3 <  < eb2:
In this case the transition of bt; ht; and et is given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8<:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < 
B3 (bt 1) ; 1; 0
	
if bt 1  :
The relevant dynamics is fully determined by the relationship between  and the
potential steady states b1 and b2. It is straightforward to see that there will be at
most two potential steady states and, hence, only two social classes may appear in the
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long run one: the class of unskilled individuals exerting e¤ort and the class of skilled
individuals making no e¤ort.
Case 3. eb2 <  < eb3:
Here the transition of the endogenous variables is given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < eb2;
B1 (bt 1) ; 0; 0
	
if bt 1 2
heb2;  ;

B4 (bt 1) ; 1; 1
	
if bt 1 2
h
;eb3 ;

B3 (bt 1) ; 1; 0
	
if bt 1  eb3:
(4.1)
In the next section we will show that in this scenario the dynamics of the variables
bt; ht; and et is fully determined by the relationship between ; eb2; eb3 and the potential
steady states. Note that in this case there are at most four potential stationary values
of bequests b1; b2; b3 and b4; with b1 < b2 < b4 and b3 < b4. Here many congurations
are possible in the long run. For instance, if eb2 < b1 <  < b2 < b4 < eb3 the economy
converges towards a two-class society where the two classes correspond to the steady
states b1 and b4; with unskilled workers not exerting e¤ort and with skilled workers
making e¤ort, respectively. Other congurations are possible like, for instance, a two-
class society with the classes being locally stable, a three-class society with two classes
forming a cycle and the other being locally stable, a single social class constituting a
stable stationary equilibrium, a four class-society where two classes form a cycle and the
other two form another cycle. The latter case, which could arise under some additional
parametric assumptions, will be of special interest for us since it allows the possibility
of delivering four social classes in the long run.
Case 4.  < min
neb2;eb3o :
In this case the evolution of bequests, education and e¤ort is given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < ;
B4 (bt 1) ; 1; 1
	
if bt 1 2
h
;eb3 ;

B3 (bt 1) ; 1; 0
	
if bt 1  eb3:
Observe that in this case the threshold eb2 is irrelevant. Moreover, the relevant dynamics
of the endogenous variables is fully determined by the relationship between ; eb3; and
the potential steady states: Since in this case the number of steady states can be at
most three, only three classes may appear in the long run: (i) a class with unskilled
agents who exert e¤ort, (ii) a class with skilled agents who make no e¤ort, and (iii) a
class with skilled agents who exert e¤ort. Several stationary situations are possible in
this case: we can have locally stable classes and cycles involving switches between two
classes.
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5. The dynamics of dynastic wealth and the existence of cycles
In this section we will analyze the long-run dynamics of lifetime income and bequests
within a given dynasty by using the equilibrium transition of lifetime income and
bequests characterized in the previous section. The dynamics of lifetime income
depends on the return from education (i.e., the education premium), the values of the
thresholds of bequest for which individuals switch their decisions concerning e¤ort and
education, and the values of potential steady states of bequests. We have seen in the
previous section that a large number of cases arises for the dynamics of dynastic wealth
in spite of the simplicity of our model. In order to comply with the empirical evidence
presented in the Introduction, we focus here in a dynamic equilibrium displaying
intergenerational persistence in education levels but high intergenerational mobility in
wealth. This implies that we should consider those parametric congurations that allow
the economy to generate four wealth classes: (i) non-educated individuals who do not
make e¤ort; (ii) non-educated individuals who make e¤ort; (iii) educated individuals
who do not make e¤ort; and (iv) educated individuals who make e¤ort. Finally,
according to our main objective, we will analyze under which conditions the education
status is intergenerational preserved while wealth status is not.
From the Case 3 in the previous section, we observe that the previous four-classes
scenario occurs only if the two following conditions simultaneously hold :
(a) The education is always protable regardless the level of e¤ort, w (1; 0) w (0; 0) >
R:
(b) The thresholds of bequests characterizing the bequest function satisfyeb2 <  < eb3.
We now characterize the conditions on the parameters of the model ensuring thateb2 <  < eb3: First, we know that eb2 < eb3 if and only if  < e1 (see (2.14)). Secondly,
we obtain that  > eb2 if and only if
 > e2  w (0; 1) +R
w (0; 0) +R
: (5.1)
Therefore, the threshold eb2 is smaller than the education cost when the utility gain
obtained by non-educated individuals from making e¤ort is su¢ ciently small. To gain
some intuition about the previous condition, consider an individual who has received
an amount of inheritance equal to the education cost  and has decided not to become
educated: This marginal individual will prefer not to exert e¤ort if U (0; 0) > U(0; 1),
which using (2.10) becomes
(1 + ) ln [w (0; 0) +R] +M > (1 + ) ln [w (0; 1) +R]  +M:
After simplifying the previous inequality becomes in turn the condition (5.1). This
inequality implies that an individual receiving an amount of inheritance slightly smaller
than  obviously becomes uneducated and decides not to exert e¤ort. Therefore, he will
leave a small bequest to their direct descendants that will not enable them to acquire
education. From inspection, we see that inequality (5.1) means that the e¤ort premium
in terms of utility for non-educated individuals is small so that the relatively richest
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unskilled individuals will decide optimally not to exert e¤ort so that the accumulation of
wealth within the dynasty will never allow their members to pay for the education cost.
This explains the intergenerational persistence in the low educational levels. Finally,
we get that eb3 >  if and only if
 < e3  w (1; 1)
w (1; 0)
: (5.2)
Thus, the thresholdeb3 is larger than the education cost when the utility gain obtained by
educated individuals from making e¤ort is su¢ ciently large. Similarly, we can consider
an individual who has received an amount of inheritance equal to the education cost
 and has decided to acquire education This marginal individual will prefer to exert
e¤ort if U (1; 1) > U(1; 0), which using (2.10) becomes
(1 + ) ln [w (1; 1)]  +M > (1 + ) ln [w (1; 0)] +M:
After simplifying the previous inequality becomes in turn the condition (5.2). Hence, an
individual receiving an amount of inheritance slightly larger than  obviously becomes
educated and decides to exert e¤ort. Therefore, he will leave an amount of bequest
to their direct descendants that will enable them to acquire education. Again, from
inspection, we see that inequality (5.2) means that the e¤ort premium in terms of
utility for educated individuals is large so that the poorest skilled individuals will nd
protable to exert e¤ort so that the amount of wealth transmitted intergenerationally by
means of bequests will be always su¢ ciently large so as to cover the education cost. This
explains the intergenerational persistence in the high educational levels. Therefore, the
previous inequalities (5.1) and (5.2) imply the intergenerational segmentation between
educated and non-educated individuals. Observe that under the previous conditions
the four branches of the bequest function (3.1) are operative (see (4.1)).
The condition  2
e2; e3 highlights the role of complementarity between education
and e¤ort in determining the dynamics of wealth as (5.1) and (5.2) imply together a
complementarity in terms of utility between education and e¤ort: the premium in
terms of utility from making e¤ort is small for non-educated individuals, whereas this
premium is large for the educated ones. An economy with four classes does not arise
in the absence of complementarity in terms of utility between education and e¤ort. On
the one hand, if  < e2; then the income gain obtained by non-educated individuals
from making e¤ort is not su¢ ciently small and, therefore,  < eb2:We have shown in the
previous section that there are three wealth classes at most in this case as the class of
unskilled workers do not making e¤ort does not arise. On the other hand, if  > e3; then
the income gain obtained by educated individuals from making e¤ort is not su¢ ciently
large and, therefore, eb3 < :We have also shown that there are also three wealth classes
at most in this case as there will be no skilled workers exerting e¤ort. Therefore, the
existence of four social classes requires two types of complementarity between education
and e¤ort: complementarity in terms of labor earnings and complementarity in terns
of utility.
As we have said in the previous section, even if the necessary conditions for a four-
class society we have just discussed hold, the economy may exhibit di¤erent dynamics
depending on the relationship between the thresholds and the potential steady states
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of bequests. Let us focus our analysis on a particular case where the economy exhibits
four classes with very strong persistence of the education status within a dynasty and
extreme mobility in wealth within each skill type. In fact, this extreme mobility will
take the form of a deterministic cycle driven by the forces lying behind the Carnegie
conjecture. To this end we need to assume that the bequest function (3.1) does not
exhibit any xed point so that the potential xed points b1; b2, b3, and b4 satisfy the
following conditions: b1 < eb2 < b2 and b3 < eb3 < b4: In Figure 1 we show the bequest
function when these conditions hold together with  2
e2; e3.
[Insert Figure 1]
We know that B1 (bt 1) < B2 (bt 1) < B4 (bt 1) and B3 (bt 1) < B4 (bt 1) for all
bt 1. Concerning the relationship between B2 (bt 1) and B3 (bt 1) ; we know from (3.1)
that B2 (bt 1) < B3 (bt 1) if and only if
w (1; 0) R > w (0; 1) ; (5.3)
that is, when the minimum labor income that can get an educated individual net of
education cost is larger than the maximum labor income that can obtain a non-educated
individual. Note that from part (c) of Assumption A, condition (5.3) implies that
education is always protable, namely, w (1; 0)   w (0; 0) > R: Therefore, condition
(5.3) imposes a stronger protability condition on education. This is indeed the case
depicted in Figure 1. However, we do not need to impose this condition for obtaining
the type of dynamics we are looking for.
Figure 2 displays a possible dynamics of bequests for our benchmark economy,
where bequests do not converge to any of the potential steady states and the economy
converges to a four-class society. In the long run, the fraction of educated dynasties
will be in a cycle where generations that make no e¤ort and leave an amount of bequest
equal to b4 alternate with generations that exert e¤ort and leave a bequest equal b3:
The fraction of non-educated dynasties will also be in a cycle where generations that do
not exert e¤ort and leave an amount of bequest equal to b2 alternate with generations
that make e¤ort and leave a bequest equal to b1:
[Insert Figure 2]
Note that the previous two cycles can also arise even when B2 (bt 1) > B3 (bt 1) as
can be seen in the situation depicted in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3]
As was pointed out in the previous section, the dynamics that may emerge under
the parametric Case 3 depends crucially on the relationship between eb2; eb3,  and the
potential steady states of bequest. In fact, the existence of the two cycles illustrated
in Figures 2 and 3 requires the following additional restrictions. On the one hand, the
cycle governing unskilled dynasties exists if and only if
b1 2
eb2;  and b2 2 0;eb2 : (5.4)
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Clearly, under these conditions, we have B2
 
b2

= b1 and B1
 
b1

= b2, which
guarantees the existence of the cycle followed by non-educated dynasties. Moreover,
the cycle followed by educated individuals emerges if and only if
b3 2
eb3;1 and b4 2 ;eb3 : (5.5)
We see that, under the previous conditions, B3
 
b3

= b4 and B1
 
b4

= b3; which proves
the existence of the cycle governing educated dynasties. In Appendix B, the previous
two conditions are characterized in terms of the parameter values of the economy.
Moreover, we show through a numerical example that conditions (5.4) and (5.5) are
compatible with the previous conditions (5.1) and (5.2).
Conditions (5.4) and (5.5) have an easy interpretation. On the one hand, the fact
that the values of b1 and b2 are smaller than the education cost  prevents unskilled
dynasties from investing in human capital. Therefore, all the dynasties starting with
an amount of inheritance smaller than  eventually converge to the cycle dened
by the pair
 
b2; b1

where generations remain unskilled. On the other hand, all the
dynasties with an initial inheritance larger than the education cost  will converge to the
cycle characterized by the pair
 
b4; b3

where generations remain skilled. These latter
dynasties enjoy an initial wealth that allows them to purchase education and, moreover,
they nd very protable to maintain their education status across generations.
In the Appendix C we explicitly characterize the previous two long-run cycles under
all the aforementioned conditions. On the one hand, the bequests of non-educated
individuals oscillate between the following two values:
b1 =
 [w (0; 1) + w (0; 0)]
(1  2)R (5.6)
and
b2 =
 [w (0; 0) + w (0; 1)]
(1  2)R : (5.7)
The members of generations who inherit the amount b1 do not make e¤ort and leave
amount b2 to their descendants, whereas the individuals of the generations inheriting
the amount b2 make e¤ort and leave the amount b1. Observe that b2 < b1: On the other
hand, the bequests of educated individuals oscillate between the following two values:
b3 =
 [w (1; 1) + w (1; 0)]
(1  2)R  

1   (5.8)
and
b4 =
 [w (1; 0) + w (1; 1)]
(1  2)R  

1  : (5.9)
The members of generations inheriting the amount b3 do not make e¤ort and leave the
amount b4 to their descendants, whereas the individuals of the generations that inherit
the amount b4 make e¤ort and leave the amount b3. Finally, observe that b4 < b3:
Note that our benchmark economy with cycles does not exhibit mobility in human
capital in the long-run, whereas it exhibits a very strong mobility in e¤ort and, thus, in
lifetime income and bequests. The stronger mobility in wealth relative to the mobility
in education levels is supported by the empirical evidence as we have argued in the
Introduction.
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6. Inequality in the long run and comparative statics
In this section, we will characterize the long-run inequality emerging in the benchmark
economy displaying endogenous cycles. First, we will perform a wealth comparison
between individuals with the same human capital and di¤erent e¤ort. Concerning non-
educated individuals, we have two types of individuals: (i) individuals who inherit b1
and do not make e¤ort (i.e., they receive a large inheritance and a small labor income)
so that their lifetime income is given by Rb1+w (0; 0) ; and (ii) individuals who inherit
b2 and make e¤ort (i.e., they receive a small inheritance and a large labor income) so
that their lifetime income is given by Rb2 + w (0; 1) : Therefore, the wealth inequality
between non-educated individuals is
Rb2 + w (0; 1)
  Rb1 + w (0; 0) = w (0; 1)  w (0; 0)
1 + 
> 0: (6.1)
With respect to educated individuals, we have two types of individuals: (i)
individuals who inherit b3 and do not make e¤ort (i.e., they receive a large inheritance
and a small labor income) so that their lifetime income is given by Rb3 +w (1; 0) ; and
(ii) individuals who inherit b4 and make e¤ort (i.e., they receive a small inheritance and
a large labor income) so that their lifetime income is given by Rb4+w (1; 1) : Therefore,
the wealth inequality between non-educated individuals is
Rb4 + w (1; 1)
  Rb3 + w (1; 0) = w (1; 1)  w (1; 0)
1 + 
> 0: (6.2)
We observe that a large inheritance discourages the e¤ort of individuals in the spirit
of the Carnegie conjecture. Furthermore, the di¤erence in inheritance is more than
compensated by the di¤erence in labor income. Therefore, the educated individuals
who receive the larger inheritance will be the poorest among the class of educated
individuals. The same applies for the class of non-educated individuals.
We can now compare the wealth between individuals with di¤erent human capital
but exerting the same amount of e¤ort. The di¤erence of wealth between educated and
non-educated individuals who do not make e¤ort is
Rb3 + w (1; 0) 

Rb1 + w (0; 0)

=
 [w (1; 1)  w (0; 1)] + w (1; 0)  w (0; 0)
1  2  
R
1   > 0; (6.3)
whereas the di¤erence of wealth between educated and non-educated individuals who
make e¤ort is
Rb4 + w (1; 1) 

Rb2 + w (0; 1)

=
 [w (1; 0)  w (0; 0)] + w (1; 1)  w (0; 1)
1  2  
R
1   > 0: (6.4)
Obviously, educated individuals exhibit a larger wealth than non-educated individuals
when they make the same e¤ort. This follows from applying to (6.3) and (6.4)
the condition w (1; 0)   w (0; 0) > R and the existence conditions b1 2
eb2;  ;
b2 2

0;eb2 ; b3 2 eb3;1 and b4 2 ;eb3.
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We can now analyze the e¤ects on the long-run distribution and its associated
inequality of marginal variations in the fundamentals of the benchmark economy. Let
us start by considering three marginal shocks hitting this economy and their equivalence
in terms of scal policy reforms, where the corresponding changes in taxes or subsidies
will be devoted to government spending and not returned to the individuals.
1. A marginal reduction in the education cost : This is equivalent to an increase
in the rate of a education subsidy. We see from (6.1), (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4)
that this policy change results only in an increase in inequality between educated
and non-educated individuals. This is so because the individuals who educate
their children will have now more disposable wealth as they have to pay less for
education.
2. A reduction in the education and e¤ort premiums. This implies a decrease in
labor income gaps w (1; 1)   w (1; 0) ; w (0; 1)   w (0; 0) ; w (1; 1)   w (0; 0) and
w (1; 0) w (0; 1) : To this end, we have to change three of the four labor earnings
(for instance, w (1; 1) ; w (1; 0) and w (0; 1)) by di¤erent amounts. To study this
kind of shock is equivalent to study the e¤ects of proportional or progressive
taxation on labor income. Obviously, this will result in a reduction of inequality
between any pair of two classes in this economy
3. A marginal decrease in the saving return R: This is equivalent to raise the at tax
rate on capital income. We see from (6.1), (6.2) and the denition of  in (3.2)
that, as  is increasing in R; a decrease in the return R results in larger inequality
both within the class of educated people and within the class of uneducated
people. To understand this e¤ect note that the poorest individuals both within the
class of educated and within the class of uneducated have received an inheritance
larger than the respective richest individuals. In spite of this larger inheritance
they have become poorer because they have exerted less e¤ort. Therefore, the
di¤erence in gross capital income between the richest and the poorest (R
 
b2   b1

for the uneducated and R
 
b4   b3

for the educated) increases as the return R
becomes lower since b2 < b1 and b4 < b3. Finally, the comparison concerning
the degree of inequality within a class of individuals exerting the same amount
of e¤ort is generally ambiguous.
The previous three types of shocks we have just mentioned could alter the social
stratication when its introduction is non-marginal. Obviously, a big shock may alter
the long-run number of social classes. In the next section we will analyze the impact
of a particular sizeable policy shock a¤ecting the characteristics of the welfare state.
7. Welfare state and social stratication
The dynamics of dynastic wealth changes dramatically when some of the conditions
generating the previous benchmark economy do not hold. Let us rst see what would
happen when the relationship between eb2; eb3,  and the potential steady states of
bequest di¤ers from that of the benchmark economy.
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If eb2 < b1; then the cycle of non-educated individuals will not emerge. Hence, the
non-educated individuals will not make e¤ort and will leave a level of bequest equal
to b1 in the long run. If eb2 > b2; then the cycle of non-educated individuals will not
arise. Hence, all the non-educated individuals will make e¤ort and will leave a level of
bequest equal to b2 in the long run. If eb3 < b3; then the cycle of educated individuals
will not emerge. Hence, the educated individuals will not make e¤ort and will leave
a level of bequest equal to b3 in the long run. Finally, if eb3 > b4; then the cycle of
educated individuals will not arise. Therefore, all the educated individuals will make
e¤ort and will leave a level of bequest equal to b4 in the long run.
From the previous argument, we can conclude that big shocks can lead the
benchmark economy to potentially loose some of its four classes. We are now going to
illustrate the argument with an example where the education costs is subjected to a
sizeable shock. In particular, we are going to assume that a reform in the welfare state
is introduced so that the cost of education faced by individuals is reduced dramatically.
Note that the threshold eb2 is independent of the education cost  but the threshold eb3
decreases by the same amount as the cost  does (see (2.11) and (2.12)). Moreover,
the value of the xed point b3 rises as  decreases (see 3.5). In Figure 4 we depict
the situation emerging after this non-marginal change: the cycle involving educated
individuals disappears as b3 has become larger than eb3 and, hence, all the educated
individuals end up not exerting e¤ort. This is so because to exert e¤ort is no longer
necessary to preserve the skill level across individuals belonging to the same dynasty.
Moreover, the size of the population that becomes educated increases due to the
reduction in : This mechanism driving the change in the level of e¤ort exerted by
skilled individuals complements the one suggested by Prescott (2004), where changes
in labor supply were motivated by labor taxes, whereas our mechanism relies directly
on the generosity of the welfare state.
[Insert Figure 4]
Note also that, if the decrease in the education cost is very large, we could arrive at
a situation where  < eb2 and then the cycle of uneducated individuals also disappears
and there is only one social class in the long run formed by skilled individuals exerting
no e¤ort as it can be seen in Figure 5.
[Insert Figure 5]
A similar analysis leading to the elimination of some social classes can be conducted
through sizeable changes in the relative distance between the four wages faced by the
potential four classes of our economy. These changes in wages could be a consequence
of progressive taxation or of skill-specic technological shocks.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have characterized the conditions under which an economy could
display simultaneously stationary cycles in wealth and persistence in the education
attainment across generations. The oscillations of wealth arise because individuals who
receive a large inheritance optimally decide not to exert e¤ort in their occupations,
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which agrees with the idea underlying the Carnegie conjecture. The resulting lifetime
income of these individuals becomes smaller than that of their parents and then they
leave a small amount of bequest, which forces the next generation to exert e¤ort again.
The model displays the realistic feature that unskilled individuals get smaller bequests
than skilled individuals. This property, together with the existence of a xed indivisible
cost of schooling and a borrowing constraint on education investment, forces the direct
descendants of unskilled individuals to remain unskilled. However, the descendants
of skilled individuals can a¤ord the cost of education thanks to the larger inheritance
they receive. Therefore, we obtain a perfect persistence of the education status even
tough this persistence is compatible with uctuations of wealth both inside the class of
educated individuals and inside the class of uneducated ones. Our model generates thus
a rich social class structure with rich skilled workers, poor unskilled workers together
with relative poor skilled workers and relative rich unskilled workers.
Our model is deterministic and all the uctuations of wealth are endogenous. It
is straightforward to generate transitions from each class to any of the other three
classes by introducing an exogenous variable, like a class-idiosyncratic productivity
shock a¤ecting the relationship between e¤ort, human capital, and wage compensation.
However, our non-stochastic model allows us to highlight the role that the
complementarity between e¤ort and education plays in order to generate this rich
class structure exhibiting intergenerational persistence in education levels. When such
a complementarity is appropriately modied, the number of classes could decrease
dramatically and mobility in the levels of human capital could arise.
Our analysis provides thus new insights on the factors and policies that either
prevent or promote societies characterized by equal opportunity and e¢ cient use of
resources. Our model has also obvious implications for economic development as it
may explain quite naturally di¤erences in wealth per capita across countries and the
existence of poverty traps as a consequence of di¤erent education costs, tax systems, or
technologies. Moreover, our model directly links the changes in the wage distribution
across occupations and the new complemenatarities among di¤erent levels and types
of skill that technological change has brought about in recent years with the dramatic
modication of the social structure (see Autor and Dorn, 2013).
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Appendix
A. Transitional dynamics when education is not always protable
In this appendix we characterize the transition of bequest, e¤ort and human capital
when the investment in education is either not protable for all agents or when it is only
protable for the agents who exert e¤ort. These cases correspond to the parametric
Congurations 1 and 2, respectively, which were presented in Section 3.
1. Education is not protable: R > w (1; 1)  w (0; 1) :
Under this conguration, no individual wants to invest in education because the
education premium is always smaller than the present value of education cost with
independence of the level of e¤ort exerted. Hence, only the branches B1 (bt 1) and
B2 (bt 1) of the bequest function (3.1) are operative, with B1 (bt 1) < B2 (bt 1) for all
bt 1: Therefore, given bt 1 individuals must rst decide if they want to make a positive
e¤ort. This decision depends on the value of the threshold eb2: Agents make positive
e¤ort if bt 1 < eb2 and make no e¤ort if bt 1 > eb2: The transition of bequests, education
and e¤ort is then given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8<:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < eb2;
B1 (bt 1) ; 0; 0
	
if bt 1  eb2:
The dynamics of the endogenous variables is determined by the relationship between eb2
and the potential steady states b1 and b2: It is straightforward to see that the following
dynamics may arise:
(a) If eb2 > b2; then the economy converges to a one-class society with fbt; xt 1; etg =
fb2; 0; 1g ; i.e., with only unskilled individuals who make e¤ort.
(b) If eb2 < b1; then the economy converges to a one-class society with fbt; xt 1; etg =
fb1; 0; 0g ; i.e., with only unskilled individuals who make no e¤ort.
(c) If eb2 2 (b1; b2) ; then the economy does not converge to a steady state. The
economy follows instead a cycle. In this case, poor dynasties make positive e¤ort
and accumulate wealth. When they reach a su¢ cient large level of bequests,
their descendants do not make positive e¤ort and disaccumulate wealth, which
makes them poor again. Dynasties eventually converge to a cycle along which
poor generations with positive e¤ort alternate with rich generations wit no e¤ort.
Note that in this case the economy thus converges to a two-class society in the
long-run.
2. Education is only protable for workers who make e¤ort: w (1; 1) w (0; 1) > R >
w (1; 0)  w (0; 0) :
Here the education premium for individuals who make e¤ort is larger than the present
value of the education cost. However, this is not the case for the individuals who
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do not make e¤ort. This implies that the individuals who acquire education should
also make positive e¤ort. Hence, the branch B3 (bt 1) of the bequest function (3.1)
is not operative in this scenario. Moreover, under this conguration, we have that
B1 (bt 1) < B2 (bt 1) < B4 (bt 1) for all bt 1.
Given the amount of inheritance bt 1; the individual decision concerning the amount of
bequest left, education, and e¤ort depends obviously on the education cost  and the
values of the thresholds eb2 and eb4: Hence, we should distinguish between several cases
depending on the raking of ; eb2 and eb4: However, we already know from Section 3 thateb2 < eb4:We next analyze all the possible cases that may arise under this conguration:
Case 1. eb2 < eb4 < .
Here, the transition of bequests, education and e¤ort is given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8<:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < eb2;
B1 (bt 1) ; 0; 0
	
if bt 1  eb2:
Observe that in this case the threshold eb4 is irrelevant. The dynamics of the endogenous
variables is fully driven by the relationship between eb2 and the potential steady states
b1 and b2. Since in this case the number of steady states can be at most two, the
following three congurations may appear in the long run:
(a) If eb2 > b2; then the economy converges to a one-class society with fbt; xt 1; etg =
fb2; 0; 1g ; i.e., with only unskilled individuals who make e¤ort.
(b) If eb2 < b1; then the economy converges to a one-class society with fbt; xt 1; etg =
fb1; 0; 0g ; i.e., with only unskilled individuals who make no e¤ort.
(c) If eb2 2 (b1; b2) ; then the economy does not converge to a steady state. The
economy follows instead a cycle. In this case, the poor dynasties make positive
e¤ort and accumulate wealth and, once they reach a su¢ cient large level of
bequests, their descendants do not make positive e¤ort and disaccumulate wealth,
which makes them poor again. Dynasties eventually approach a cycle along
which poor generations with positive e¤ort alternate with rich generations without
e¤ort. The economy thus converges to a two-class society in the long-run.
Case 2. eb2 <  < eb4.
In this case the transition of bt; ht; and et
fbt; ht; etg =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < eb2;
B1 (bt 1) ; 0; 0
	
if either bt 1 2
heb2;  or bt 1  eb4;

B4 (bt 1) ; 1; 1
	
if bt 1 2
h
;eb4 :
The dynamics of bequest and lifetime income is then fully determined by the
relationship between the bequest threshold eb2 and the potential steady states b1 and b2;
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and the relationship between the bequest threshold eb4 and the potential steady states
b3 and b4: Since in this case the number of steady states can be at most three, only
three classes may appear in the long run: (i) the class of unskilled who exert e¤ort, (ii)
the class of unskilled who make no e¤ort, and (iii) the class of skilled who exert e¤ort.
Several stationary dynamics are possible: we can have locally stable classes and cycles
involving switches between two classes.
Case 3.  < eb2 < eb4.
In this case the transition of bequests, education and e¤ort is given by
fbt; ht; etg =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

B2 (bt 1) ; 0; 1
	
if bt 1 < ;
B4 (bt 1) ; 1; 1
	
if bt 1 2
h
;eb4 ;

B1 (bt 1) ; 0; 0
	
if bt 1  eb4:
Observe that in this case the value of the threshold eb2 is irrelevant. The dynamics of
bequest and lifetime income is then fully determined by the relationship between the
education cost , the bequest threshold eb4; and the three potential steady states of
bequests (b1; b2 and b4): As in the previous case, since the number of steady states
can be at most three, only three classes may appear in the long run: (i) the class of
unskilled who exert e¤ort, (ii) the class of unskilled who make no e¤ort, and (iii) the
class of skilled who exert e¤ort. Similarly, several stationary dynamics are possible: we
can have locally stable classes and cycles involving switches between two classes.
B. Conditions for the existence of two cycles
Using (2.11), (5.6) and (5.7), conditions (5.4) for the existence of the cycle governing
non-educated families can be written as
 (   1)   1  2w (0; 1) +     2w (0; 0) > 0; (B.1)
 [w (0; 1) + w (0; 0)] <
 
1  2R; (B.2)
and  
2   1w (0; 1) +  (   1) +   1  2w (0; 0) < 0: (B.3)
Similarly, using (2.12), (5.8) and (5.9), conditions (5.5) for the emergence of the cycle
followed by educated individuals become
 (   1)   1  2w (1; 1) +     2w (1; 0) > (   1) (1 + )R; (B.4)
 [w (1; 0) + w (1; 1)] > (1 + )R; (B.5)
and  
2   1w (1; 1) +  (   1) +   1  2w (1; 0) < (   1) (1 + )R: (B.6)
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Solving for  in inequality (B.1), we see that this inequality holds if and only if
 > 2; where
2 
 
1 +   2w (0; 1) + 2w (0; 0)
w (0; 1) + w (0; 0)
:
Inequality (B.2) can be expressed as a constraint on the maximum value of . To
see this, we rewrite the inequality as the following second order polynomial inequality
in the slope  of the bequest function:
P ()  2 (w (0; 0) +R) + w (0; 1) R < 0:
Note that the unique positive solution for P () = 0 is
 =
 w (0; 1) +
q
w (0; 1)2 + 4 [w (0; 0) +R]R
2 (w (0; 0) +R)
:
so that (B.2) holds if and only if  < :
Solving for  in inequality (B.3), we see that this inequality holds if and only if
 < 1; where
1  w (0; 1) + w (0; 0)
2w (0; 1) + (1 +   2)w (0; 0) :
If we solve for  in inequality (B.4), we get that this inequality can be written as
 > 1, where
1 
(1 +   2)w (1; 1) + 2w (1; 0)  (1 + )R
w (1; 1) + w (1; 0)  (1 + )R :
Note that the denominator of the previous expression is positive since w (1; 1) >
w (1; 0) > R under the Conguration 3 we are considering.
Similarly, inequality (B.5) can be expressed as a constraint on the minimum value
of : To see this, we rewrite the inequality as the following second order polynomial
inequality in the slope  of the bequest function:
Q ()  2w (1; 1) +  [w (1; 0) R] R > 0:
The unique positive solution for Q () = 0 is
 =
  [w (1; 0) R] +
q
[w (1; 0) R]2 + 4w (1; 1)R
2w (1; 1)
:
so that (B.5) holds whenever  > :
Finally, inequality (B.6) holds if and only if
 < 2  w (1; 1) + w (1; 0)  (1 + )R
2 [w (1; 1)  w (1; 0)] + (1 + ) [w (1; 0) R] ;
where the denominator of 2 is positive.
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Therefore, we can summarize our previous analysis by saying that conditions (5.4)
and (5.5) for the existence of two cycles are equivalent to the following:
 2  ;  and  2  max f1; 2g ;min1; 2	 :
We next provide an example under which all the conditions that give rise to
the existence of two cycles with extreme intergenerational mobility in the amount of
inheritance and absolute persistence in education levels are satised. Consider thus the
following values for the four wages of the economy:
w(0; 0) = 0:5; w(0; 1) = 1:15; w(1; 0) = 2:5; w(1; 1) = 5;
We choose the values of ; R; n; and  so that  = 0:17; R = 0:3 and  = 1:91: Under
this parameter conguration, we get that  = 0:225;  = 0:109 so that  2  ;  :
Moreover, in this case we get 1 = 2:0454; 2 = 1:9174; 1 = 1:809; 2 = 1:9076 so that
 2  max f1; 2g ;min1; 2	 :
Note that this example satises the condition under which education is always
protable for all individuals since w(1; 0)   w(0; 0) = 2 > R = 0:3: Finally, the
conditions (5.1),
w(0; 1) +R
w(0; 0) +R
= 1:81 <  = 1:91
and
w(1; 1)
w(1; 0)
= 2 >  = 1:91;
are also satised.
C. Characterization of cycles in the benchmark economy
Next, we explicitly nd the two cycles that arise in the Benchmark Economy.
(a) We will rst characterize the cycle that emerges for non-educated individuals: To
this end we use Figure 6. The cycle implies that those dynasties with a initial
bequest below the education cost  converge to a cycle along which their bequests
oscillate between two social classes characterized by the bequest values B1 (bt 1)
and B2 (bt 1) : More precisely, they oscillate between point A and C in Figure 6.
Observe that the point A corresponds to fbt; ht; etg =

b2; 0; 1
	
, whereas point
C corresponds to fbt; ht; etg =

b1; 0; 0
	
: In order to compute the bequest levels
b1 and b2; we use the fact that the cycle denes the square ABCD: Hence, the
following conditions should hold in a cycle:
b1  
 
b1 + a

= b1   b2; (C.1)
and
b2  
 
b2 + c

= b2   b1; (C.2)
with
a =
w (0; 0)
R
;
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and
c =
w (0; 1)
R
:
By solving the system (C.1)-(C.2), we obtain
b1 =
a+ c
1  2 ;
and
b2 =
c+ a
1  2 ;
which become equal to the expressions (5.6) and (5.7), respectively. In order
to prove the existence of this cycle, we should ensure that b1 and b2 are in the
operative part of policy functions B1 (bt 1) and B2 (bt 1) ; respectively. From
Figures 2 or 3 we see that this hold in the benchmark economy when b2 2

0;eb2
and b1 2
eb2;  :
[Insert Figure 6]
(b) Using the same procedure as before we characterize the cycle that emerges for the
educated individuals. The existence of a cycle implies that those dynasties with a
initial bequest above  converge to a cycle of two social classes along which their
bequests oscillate between B3 (bt 1) and B4 (bt 1) : More precisely, they oscillate
between two points: fbt; ht; etg =

b3; 1; 0
	
and fbt; ht; etg =

b4; 1; 1
	
; with
b3 =
m+ n
1  2 ; (C.3)
and
b4 =
n+m
1  2 ; (C.4)
where
m = 

w (1; 0)
R
  

;
and
n = 

w (1; 1)
R
  

:
After some algebra, (C.1) and (C.2) become equal to (5.8) and (5.9), respectively.
This cycle exist if b3 and b4 are in the operative part of policy functions B3 (bt 1)
and B4 (bt 1) ; respectively. By using Figures 2 or 3, we see that this happens in
the benchmark economy when b3 2
eb3;1 and b4 2 ;eb3 :
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Figure 1. The bequest function.
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Figure 2. Cycles in the benchmark economy when B3 > B2.
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Figure 3. Cycles in the benchmark economy when B2 > B3.
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Figure 4. Equilibria after a big reduction in the cost  of education.
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Figure 5. Equilibria after a very big reduction in the cost  of education.
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Figure 6. Characterization of cycles.
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